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TORT LAW--Constructive Fraud or Actual Fraud-Is There Still a
Distinction Between Them? Wolf and Klar Cos. v. Garner

I. INTRODUCTION

In Wolf and Klar Cos. v. Garner,' the New Mexico Supreme Court
addressed the question of whether one party was liable to another for
constructive fraud in the absence of a fiduciary relationship between the
parties. 2 The supreme court held that the absence of a fiduciary relationship would not preclude liability for constructive fraud.3 The court's
rationale for arriving at this conclusion, however, is unclear.
This Note will demonstrate that the Wolf decision, by failing to fully
utilize New Mexico case law, blurred the distinction between actual and
constructive fraud. The distinction between actual and constructive fraud
is important in that actual fraud involves intentional conduct, while constructive fraud does not. The decision rendered in Wolf made it difficult
to determine when a claim will lie for actual fraud as opposed to constructive fraud. Consequently, plaintiffs will be more likely to plead both
actual fraud and constructive fraud as causes of action against a defendant.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Some time in 1977, Robert Garner began purchasing jewelry items
from Wolf and Klar Companies, a wholesale jeweler.4 Every sales transaction was handled on a charge account basis through Wolf and Klar's
agent, Bobby Gee. 5 Gee and Garner knew each other personally prior to
1. 101 N.M. 116, 679 P.2d 258 (1984).
2. Id. at 118, 679 P.2d at 260. See also Leitensdorfer v. Webb, I N.M. (Gild., E.W.S. ed.) 34,
53-54 (1857) (constructive fraud was defined as "acts contrary to public policy, to sound morals,
to the provisions of a statute, etc., however honest the intention with which they may have been
performed"), affd 61 U.S. (20 How.) 176 (1857). Cf. Scudder v. Hart, 45 N.M. 76, 82, 110 P.2d
536, 539 (1941) (quoting 26 C.J. Fraud §4 (1921), where constructive fraud was defined as "a
breach of legal or equitable duty which, irrespective of the moral guilt of the fraud feasor, the law
declares fraudulent because of its tendency to deceive others, to violate public or private confidence,
or to injure public interests. Neither actual dishonesty of purpose nor intent to deceive is an essential
element of constructive fraud.").
3. 101 N.M. at 118, 679 P.2d at 260.
4. Id. at 117, 679 P.2d at 259.
5. Id. Wolf and Klar Companies entered into a written contractual agreement with Bobby Gee.
Under the terms of the contract Bobby Gee was employed to act as a sales representative for Wolf
and Klar. Specifically, Gee agreed to "sell and promote the goods, wares and merchandise of Wolf
and Klar Companies." Trial Transcript of Proceedings at I 1. Wolf & Klar Cos. v. Garner, 101
N.M. 116, 679 P.2d 258 (1984).
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the transactions. 6 Under terms of the purchase sale agreement, Gee delivered jewelry to Garner from the stock he carried on hand. 7 The merchandise was then charged to Garner's Wolf and Klar account. 8 After
each sale, Gee forwarded a sales order form to Wolf and Klar.9 Wolf and
Klar, in turn, sent Garner a monthly statement.'°
After the first three sales, Gee began ordering and receiving merchandise without Garner's knowledge, subsequently charging it to Garner's
account." Gee, however, disposed, used, and benefited from the merchandise credited to Garner's account. 2 Garner never received any of
the merchandise that Gee charged to his account, after the first three sales
were completed. 3
When Garner became aware that Gee was charging items through his
account, he told Gee to discontinue using the account in that manner.'4
Gee paid most of the outstanding charges. 5 Within a short period of time,
however, Gee again began charging merchandise to Garner's account
without Garner's knowledge.' 6 For the entire three-year period during
which Gee used Garner's charge account, Garner never notified Wolf and
Klar of Gee's personal use of the account, even though Garner received
monthly statements that reflected the charges made by Gee.' 7
Bobby Gee died in February 1981.8 At the time of Gee's death, Gee
had made $66,309.84 in purchases on Garner's open account and had
made payments totaling $57,140.30.1' The balance owed to Wolf and
6. Trial Transcript of Proceedings at 63, Wolf & Klar Cos. v. Garner, 101 N.M. 116, 679 P.2d
258 (1984).
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Defendant-Appellant's Brief in Chief at 3, Wolf & Klar Cos. v. Garner, 101 N.M. 116, 679
P.2d 258 (1984).
12. 101 N.M. at 117, 679 P.2d at 259. Although the court's opinion does not contain any language
which states exactly how Gee used and benefited from the merchandise credited to Gamer's account,
the opinion does suggest that evidence was submitted at trial which tended to show that Gee had a
drug abuse problem which required hospitalization while he was employed by Wolf and Klar Cos.
The inference, though unsubstantiated, is that Gee sold the merchandise and pocketed the proceeds.
101 N.M. at 118, 679 P.2d at 260.
13. Trial Transcript of Proceedings at 70, Wolf.
14. 101 N.M. at 117, 679 P.2d at 259. During the period of time from May 1977 through
December 1980, Wolf and Klar sent 30 charge account invoices to Garner. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. In addition to the monthly statements and invoices that Garner received from Wolf and
Klar, Garner also engaged in numerous telephone conversations with Wolf and Klar concerning the
status of Garner's charge account. See Transcript of Record at 44. Wolf & Klar Cos. v. Garner, 101
N.M. 116, 679 P.2d 258 (1984).
18. Defendant-Appellant's Brief in Chief at 3, Wolf & Klar Cos. v. Garner, 101 N.M. 116, 679
P.2d 258 (1984).
19. Transcript of Record at 44, Wolf & Klar Cos. v. Garner, 101 N.M. 116, 679 P.2d 258 (1984).
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Klar was $9,169.54.0 Only after Gee's death did Garner inform Wolf
and Klar of Gee's misuse of the charge account."
Wolf and Klar filed suit in the District Court of Lea County in an
attempt to recover the outstanding balance from Garner.22 The trial court
ruled that Gamer's silence amounted to constructive fraud because Garner
allowed Gee to misuse his charge account for three years without notifying
Wolf and Klar, who had no knowledge of Gee's dishonest conduct.23 The
New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial court,
holding that the finding of constructive fraud was justified by the evidence
and that the trial court acted within its discretion by refusing to absolve
Gamer's participation in Gee's dishonest conduct. 24
III. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
A. The Court Altered the Constructive FraudAnalysis
On appeal, Garner argued that there had been no fiduciary relationship
between himself and the plaintiff, Wolf and Klar. He maintained that,
without such a relationship, he owed no duty to disclose his knowledge
of Gee's conduct to Wolf and Klar.2" Garner contended that, absent a
duty to disclose, his conduct did not amount to constructive fraud.26 The
supreme court disagreed.
The Wolf court's holding focused on whether, under the circumstances,
Gamer's silence was contrary to sound morals and public policy.27 The
court found that Gamer's conduct was "contrary to sound morals," irrespective of any dishonesty or intent to deceive Wolf and Klar.2" The
20. Id. at 47. Upon direct examination, Garner testified that he placed no more than three orders
with Gee, that Wolf and Klar had billed him for those purchases, and that he paid for the purchases
in full. Trial Transcript of Proceedings at 64, Wolf & Klar Cos. v. Garner, 101 N.M. 116, 679 P.2d
258 (1984).
21. Trial Transcript of Proceedings at 67, Wolf & Klar Cos. v. Gamer, 101 N.M. 116, 679 P.2d
258 (1984).
22. Transcript of Record at 1-2, Wolf.
23. Id.
24. 101 N.M. at 118, 679 P.2d at 260. At trial, Garner argued that Wolf and Klar could have
pursued payment of the outstanding balance in a more vigorous fashion and that failure to do so
amounted to negligence, thereby absolving him of liability. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. 101 N.M. at 118, 679 P.2d at 260. The court relied on Leitensdorfer v. Webb, I N.M. (Gild.,
E.W.S. ed.) 34 (1857). In Leitensdorfer, appellee Webb filed an affidavit and sued out a writ of
attachment against appellants Leitensdorfer and Houghton to recover the sum of $8,297.92. 1 N.M.
(Gild., E.W.S. ed.) at 36. At trial, Webb introduced into evidence a paper purporting to be a deed
of assignment from Leitensdorfer to H.N. Smith and Thomas Biggs. I N.M. (Gild., E.W.S. ed.)
at 37. The deed of assignment was given to Smith and Biggs for the purpose of paying off Leitensdorfer's creditors. I N.M. (Gild., E.W.S. ed.) at 37. Houghton ratified this assignment. I N.M.
(Gild., E.W.S. ed.) at 38. Sufficient funds, however, were unavailable to pay all creditors. 1 N.M.
(Gild., E.W.S. ed.) at 39. Houghton contended that as the assignment was the act of Leitensdorfer
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court, however, did not state exactly why Garner's silence violated public
policy and sound morals, thus constituting constructive fraud. 9 Instead,
the court noted that, under agency law, one who intentionally aids and
abets an agent in an act which perpetrates a fraud upon his principal is
as liable as the agent to the principal for any damages suffered.3" The
court concluded that Garner's silence permitted Gee to violate Gee's duty
of honesty to Wolf and Klar.3
New Mexico case law, however, has never required intentional conduct
as a necessary element of constructive fraud. 32 In Wolf, the court recognized that intent is not an essential element of constructive fraud.
Nonetheless, the court implied that Gamer's silence was in fact intentional. 33 In effect, the court relied on an agency law principle in which
intent is an essential element to find that Garner was justifiably liable for
constructive fraud. The court's reliance on this principle is significant
because it is neither necessary to prove dishonesty of purpose nor intent
to deceive in order to sustain a cause of action for constructive fraud. 34
In fact, Scudder v. Hart35 made it very clear that the intent of the fraud
feasor was irrelevant when determining liability for constructive fraud.
The Scudder court was faced with the issue of whether a county treasurer
who mistakenly informed a mortgagor and mortagee that there were no
delinquent taxes due on the mortgaged property could be held liable for
constructive fraud due to giving erroneous information.3 6 The Scudder
alone, with which Houghton had nothing to do, the act of one defendant (Leitensdorfer) would not
authorize an attachment against Houghton himself. I N.M. (Gild., E.W.S. ed.) at 40. The supreme
court disagreed with this contention and held that where one partner makes an assignment of the
partnership which fraudulently affects creditors and is subsequently approved by the copartner, the
copartner is equally a party to the fraud, and an attachment may issue against both. I N.M. (Gild.,
E.W.S. ed.) at 50.
29. 101 N.M. at 118, 679 P.2d at 260. The court may have felt that Garner's silence was violative
of public policy and contrary to sound morals because Garner was the only person who could have
informed Wolf and Klar of the fraudulent conduct of Wolf and Klar's salesman.
30. Id.
31. Id. See, e.g., Craig v. Parsons, 22 N.M. 293, 161 P. 1117 (1916). See generally Restatement
(Second) of Agency § 312 (1958), which provides as follows: "A person who, without being privileged
to do so, intentionally causes or assists an agent to violate a duty to his principal is subject to liability
to the principal."
32. See Archuleta v. Kopp, 90 N.M. 273, 276, 562 P.2d 834, 837 (Ct. App. 1977).
33. See supra note 32.
34. 101 N.M. at 118, 679 P.2d at 260 (citing Archuleta v. Kopp, 90 N.M. 273, 276, 562 P.2d
834, 837 (Ct. App. 1977)). The court in Archuleta stated that constructive fraud occurs upon "a
breach of a legal or equitable duty, irrespective of the moral guilt of the fraudfeasor. It is not necessary
to prove dishonesty of purpose nor intent to deceive to maintain a cause of action for constructive
fraud." 90 N.M. at 276, 562 P.2d at 837.
35. 45 N.M. 76, 82, 110 P.2d 536, 539 (1941).
36. Id. at 78, 110 P.2d at 537. The treasurer advised Scudder that the property in question had
been sold for 1937 taxes and that the last half of the taxes for 1938 were delinquent. Id. Additionally,
the treasurer stated that the payment of all asessed and delinquent taxes would result in full redemption
and clearance of title to the property. Id. The treasurer was given a check for what Scudder and the
treasurer believed was the delinquent amount. Id. Shortly thereafter, the treasurer learned that taxes
for the last half of 1936 had not been paid and that the property had been sold to the state, which
assigned the sale certificate to appellee Hart. Id. After learning of the assignment, Scudder filed suit
to have appellee Hart's tax deed cancelled. Id.
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court, in concluding that the treasurer was liable, suggested the elements
of constructive fraud. Those elements were: (1) the breach of a legal or
equitable duty; (2) the breach of the duty must either deceive another or
violate the public interest; and (3) the deceived party must have relied
upon the representation of the party who breached the duty, thereby
causing harm to the deceived party.3"
The Scudder court found that the treasurer had a duty to convey accurate
information to persons attempting to redeem property that had been sold
for delinquent taxes. 38 By giving erroneous information to Scudder, the
treasurer breached his duty to impart correct information regarding the
amount of delinquent taxes due.39 Moreover, the court also found that
Scudder had a right to rely on the affirmations of the treasurer.a-The
treasurer's breach caused harm to Scudder in that a tax deed for the
property was issued to appellee Hart, thereby depriving Scudder of title
to the property. 41 Not only did the Scudder court suggest the elements of
constructive fraud, the court also recognized the duty of correct disclosure
owed to the appellant by the treasurer.4 2
B. The Court Erred in Finding Garner Liable for Constructive Fraud
Given the Wolf court's findings that Garner's conduct was intentional,
the court should have found Garner liable for actual fraud. Actual fraud
liability should have been based upon Garner's breach of the duty to
disclose the material fact of Gee's misuse of Gamer's Wolf and Klar
charge account. 43 This. duty was first recognized by the New Mexico
Supreme Court in Everett v. Gilliland.44
In Everett, the New Mexico Supreme Court addressed the question of
37. 45 N.M. 76, 81, 110 P.2d 536, 539 (1941). In imposing liability upon the treasurer, the
Scudder court relied on the rationale given in Pace v. Wright, 25 N.M. 276, 181 P. 430 (1919),
where it was suggested that the failure of a treasurer to perform the duties incumbent upon him
resulting in prejudice to a taxpayer would lead to manifest injustice and afford ample opportunities
for fraud. Id. at 282, 181 P. at 432.
38. 45 N.M. at 82, 110 P.2d at 539 (quoting 61 C.J. 1290, Taxation § 1794 (1933)). 61 C.J.
1290, Taxation § 1794 states:
It is the duty of the proper officers to impart correct information to those seeking
to redeem from tax sales, and an owner does not lose his right to redeem by
permitting the appointed time to elapse, or paying less than the proper amount,
or otherwise failing to comply with the directions of the statute, when this was
caused by the fraud of a public officer, or by the latter's inability to furnish
necessary information, or by his mistake, negligence, or miscalculation, or by
misleading advice given by him, no act of misconduct by him can prevent the
redemption.
39. 45 N.M. at 81, 110 P.2d at 539.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 78, 110 P.2d at 537.
42. Id. at 82, 110 P.2d at 539.
43. See Keeton, Fraud Concealment and Non-disclosure, 15 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1936). Professor
Keeton stated that "if either party to a contract of sale conceals or suppresses a material fact which
he is in good faith bound to disclose then his silence is fraudulent." Id. at 31. See also Wirth v.
Commercial Resources, Inc., 96 N.M. 340, 630 P.2d 292 (Ct. App. 1981).
44. 47 N.M. 269, 141 P.2d 326 (1943).
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whether the defendants, as sellers of real estate, were duty bound to make
full disclosure of all material information within their knowledge concerning the balance due on a mortgage, so that the plaintiff purchaser
would not be deceived regarding the total mortgage amount." In finding
that the defendant was liable to the plaintiff for not disclosing the existence
of an interest lien against the property, the court held that a claim of
actual fraud is maintainable where a party knowing material facts is under
a duty to speak but remains silent.' In reaching its decision, the Everett
court said:
[I]f one party to a contract ...

has superior knowledge, or knowledge

which is not within the fair and reasonable reach of the other party
and which he could not discover by the exercise of reasonable diligence, or means of knowledge which are not open to both parties
alike, he is under a legal obligation to speak, and his silence constitutes fraud, especially when the other party relies upon him to
communicate to him the true state of facts to enable him to judge of
the expediency of the bargain.47
Impliedly, the Everett court equated the duty to disclose with the duty
to exercise good faith during the bargaining and negotiating process.
Essentially, the duty of exercising good faith includes the duty to disclose
material facts to a party relying upon that disclosure48 Consequently, the
failure to disclose is actionable under both tort law, as constructive fraud,
or under contract law, as failure to exercise the duty of good faith and
fair dealing."
The Wo/f court's reluctance to use the analysis promulgated in Everett
is puzzling given that Everett was the first case to find that failure to
disclose material facts amounts to actual as opposed to constructive fraud.
Under the rationale given in Everett, to determine whether one party to
45. Id. at 275, 141 P.2d at 330.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 276, 141 P.2d at 330 (quoting 23 Am. Jur. Fraudand Deceit § 80 (1939)).
48. Id. at 275, 141 P.2d at 330 (quoting 23 Am. Jur. Fraud and Deceit § 78 (1939)). 23 Am.
Jur. Fraudand Deceit § 78 states in part:
[I]n the conduct of various transactions between persons involving business dealings, commercial negotiations, or other relationships relating to property, contracts, and miscellaneous rights, there are times and occasions when the law
imposes upon a party a duty to speak rather than to remain silent in respect to
certain facts within his knowledge and thus to disclose information, in order that
the party with whom he is dealing may be placed on an equal footing with him.
See also Villalon v. Bowen, 273 P.2d 409, 414 (Nev. 1954), where the court stated that "the
suppression of a material fact which a party is bound in good faith to disclose is equivalent to a
false representation, since it constitutes an indirect representation that such fact does not exist."
49. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205 (1979) states: "Every contract imposes upon each
party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement." See also W.
Prosser, Law of Torts § 106, at 698 (4th ed. 1971), where Dean Prosser stated that "the law appears
to be working toward the ultimate conclusion that full disclosure of all material facts must be made
whenever elementary fair conduct demands it."
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a contract owes a duty to disclose material facts to another, the first
inquiry is whether the first party had superior knowledge of a material
fact.5" In Wolf, defendant Garner admitted that he was fully aware of
Gee's misuse of his charge account. 5 ' The second inquiry is whether the
plaintiff could have discovered Gee's illegal use of Garner's charge account without Garner's assistance.52 The trial record suggests that the
only way that Wolf and Klar could have gained knowledge regarding
Gee's conduct was through Garner's disclosure.53 The final inquiry is
whether the plaintiff relied upon the representations made by the defendant.54 The trial record indicates that Wolf and Klar had reason to believe
that the charges reflected on Garner's charge account were made by
Garner.55 Clearly, under these circumstances, Wolf and Klar reasonably
relied upon the representations made by Garner. It was Wolf and Klar's
reliance upon those representations which proximately caused the harm. 56
What is particularly noteworthy about the decision rendered in Wolf is
that, on the basis of the testimony given at trial and the language contained
in the court's opinion, it appears that Garner's failure to disclose was
intentional. 57 If Garner's silence was intentional, then he should have
50. 47 N.M. at 275, 141 P.2d at 330.
51. See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text.
52. 101 N.M. at 117-18, 679 P.2d at 259-60. See also Trial Transcript of Proceedings at 6768, Wolf. ,
53. See Transcript of Proceedings at 74, which reads as follows:
Q You testified that you didn't do anything to approve these transactions that
Bobby Gee entered into?
A No, I didn't.
Q But you did not notify Wolf and Klar of your disapproval?
A No, I did not.
Q And you knew they were not aware of it or assumed that?
A Yeah, I assumed that they were not aware.
54. Id. at 67. Defendant Garner was called as an adverse witness by the plaintiff and upon direct
examination testified as follows:
Q Over some three years plus, you never made any effort to advise Wolf and
Kar as to the problem?
A No, I did not.
Q Did you know that Wolf and Klar was relying upon the account being paid
by you as it was being charged to you?
A Yeah, I'm sure they did.
55. Transcript of Record at 44, Wolf & Klar v. Garner, 101 N.M. 116, 679 P.2d 258 (1984).
The trial court judge found that during the period of time from May 1977 through December 1980,
30 separate invoices were sent to the defendant and were received by the defendant. Id. In addition
to the invoices, payments, and monthly statements exchanged between the parties, there were also
telephone calls and letters concerning the open charge account. Id.
56. See generally Keeton, supra note 43, at 39, where it is stated that "reliance is merely a phase
of the problem of causation, and when there has been reliance and damage, the misrepresentation
is a cause in fact of the damage."
57. 101 N.M. at 118, 679 P.2d at 260. In its opinion, the court emphasized the intentional nature
of Garner's conduct. Id. The Wolf court also relied upon the rationale given in Craig v. Parsons, 22
N.M. 293, 161 P. 1117 (1916), where the Craigcourt held that where a person with full knowledge
of the facts, aids and abets a broker in the commission of an act of fraud upon the principal, he is
liable to the latter for loss sustained thereby. 22 N.M. at 301, 161 P. at 1120.
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been held liable for actual fraud, rather than constructive fraud; intent is
an element of actual fraud, not constructive fraud.58 By holding that
Gamer's intentional conduct justified a finding of constructive fraud, the
court has confused acts which constitute constructive fraud 9 with those
which amount to actual fraud.6
Unfortunately, the Wolf court's confusion over the distinction between
actual fraud and constructive fraud appears to stem from an improper
reliance on Archuleta v. Kopp.6 In Archuleta, the New Mexico Court of
Appeals was faced with the issue of whether the defendant was liable for
constructive fraud or innocent misrepresentation when he listed and sold
"as is"to a sightless plaintiff a house with a defective fireplace that
subsequently caused smoke damage to the home.62 In holding the defendant liable, the court noted that two previous tenants advised the
defendant of the useless condition of the fireplace.63 The defendant, therefore, had a duty to disclose the defect because "the listing . ..tended
to deceive the public in general and the plaintiff in particular."64
What is noteworthy about the decision rendered in Archuleta is that
the court recognized that, while the defendant had a duty to disclose the
condition of the fireplace, the defendant's failure to make disclosure was
unintentional. It was this unintentional misrepresentation which provided
the basis for holding the defendant liable for constructive fraud and not
actual fraud. 65
In Wolf, however, the court's language suggests that not only was
Gamer's failure to disclose injurious to Wolf and Klar, but also implies
that Garner's act of silence was intentional.66 Assuming that his conduct
was intentional, then the court should have imposed liability for actual
fraud. Moreover, as an alternative method of imposing liability, the court
could have found that the defendant's breach of the duty of disclosure
was violative of good faith and fair dealing practices.6" Instead, the court
58. See supra note 2.
59. See supra note 34.
60. Infraud as itrelates
to nondisclosure, a charge of actual fraud ismaintainable where a party
knowing material facts
isunder a duty to speak but remains silent.
Everett v.Gilliland, 47 N.M.
269, 275, 141 P.2d 326, 330 (1943).
61. 90 N.M. 273, 562 P.2d 834 (Ct. App. 1977).
62. Id. at275, 562 P.2d at836.
63. Id.
64. Id. at276, 562 P.2d at 837. Apparently, the court felt
that
the defendant's representation was
innocent innature such that the defendant did not have the requisite intent to deceive necessary for
actual fraud. Id.
65. Id.
66. 101 N.M. at 118, 679 P.2d at 260. Although the Wolfcourt did not state that
Gamer's conduct
was intentional, the court's use of agency and tort law principles which include intentional conduct
as necessary elements indicates that the court believed that Garner's act of silence may have been
intentional. See supra note 31. See generally Restatement (Second) of Torts § 871 (1979).
67. See supra note 51.
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used agency law and found that Garner caused Gee to violate his duty
of honesty to his principal. 68 Although the court's use of agency law
produced a fair and just result, the court should have analogized to agency
law rather than employ it in a wholesale manner. By using agency law
indiscriminately, the court has promoted more confusion over the all important element of intent as it relates to actual fraud as opposed to constructive fraud.
IV. CONCLUSION
In terms of an equitable and fair effect, the decision in Wolf and Klar
Cos. v. Garnerwas correct because, of the parties, defendant Garner was
in the best position to prevent the harm which occurred. The Wolf court,
however, created a hybrid variety of constructive fraud. Essentially, constructive fraud doctrine in New Mexico now includes intentional conduct
as one of its elements. While the court did not go so far as to expressly
state that intentional conduct is an element of constructive fraud, it appears
that the court has, through inference, attempted to merge actual fraud
and constructive fraud. Whether the court intended this result is a question
with no readily apparent answer.
Moreover, by finding that Garner's conduct abridged sound morals and
by acknowledging that there was an open charge account agreement
between Wolf and Garner, the court is implying that even where there
are purely contractual relationships between parties, there are also certain
moral and social responsibilities that the parties must adhere to with
respect to one another. In rendering this decision, the court is apparently
giving notice to legal practitioners that sound ethical and moral conduct
is becoming intertwined with contractual causes of action.
ADOLPH CRAIG SUTTON

68. 101 N.M. at 118, 679 P.2d at 260.

